The Reasons of Emotion by Kronqvist, Camilla
	   1	  
Paper	  presented	  at	  XXII.	  Deutscher	  Kongress	  für	  Philosophie	  
September	  2011,	  München	  	  
The	  Reasons	  of	  Emotion∗	  	  Camilla	  Kronqvist,	  Åbo	  Akademi	  University	  camilla.kronqvist@abo.fi	  	  In	  the	  last	  decades	  powerful	  efforts	  to	  prove	  the	  rationality	  of	  emotion	  have	  been	  made	  by	   philosophers	   whose	   accounts	   of	   emotion	   may	   generally	   be	   labelled	   cognitive.	  Contrary	   to	   the	   negative	   view	   of	   emotions	   as	   passive	   occurrences,	   interruptions	   or	  disturbances	   in	   rational	   thinking	   and	   deliberative	   action,	   emotions	   are	   shown	   to	   be	  sensitive	   to	   reasoning	   and	   criticism.	   They	   have	   even	   been	   shown	   to	   inform	   our	  reasoning,	  or	  to	  constitute	  a	  form	  of	  reasoning	  themselves.	  The	  analysis	  grounding	  these	  claims	   is	  usually	   founded	   in	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	   intentionality	  of	  emotions.	   (See	  Kenny	  1963	   for	   one	   of	   the	   first	   expositions	   of	   this	   idea.)	   The	   term,	   initially	   coined	   by	   the	  psychologist	  Franz	  Brentano	  (1973,	  88),	  is	  usually	  taken	  to	  address	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  emotions	   take	   objects.	   They	   are	   directed	   at	   or	   about	   something	   or	   someone,	   and	  identified	  as	  the	  particular	  emotions	  they	  are	  by	  their	  formal	  object,	  such	  as	  fear	  by	  the	  thought	  “It	  is	  dangerous”.	  	  In	   more	   cognitivist	   accounts	   of	   emotion	   the	   discussion	   of	   intentionality	   has	   often	  been	  reduced	  to	  an	  attempt	  to	  explicate	  emotions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  beliefs	  (Taylor	  1975,	  1979)	  or	  judgements	  (Solomon	  1980,	  1993,	  Nussbaum	  1990)	  on	  which	  the	  emotions	  are	  either	  based,	  or	  simply	  are.	  Other	  accounts	  have	  rather	  emphasized	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  emotions	   constitute	   more	   complex	   embodied	   phenomena,	   involving	   a	   ”seeing-­‐as”	  (Hamlyn	  1983,	  Roberts	  2003,	  de	  Sousa	  1980)	  or	  a	  way	  of	  taking	  the	  world	  as	  being	  in	  a	  certain	   way	   (Hutchinson	   2008).	   According	   to	   the	   more	   cognitivist	   view,	   the	   kind	   of	  criticism	   that	   can	  be	  directed	  against	  emotion	  receives	  a	   straightforward	   treatment.	   If	  emotions	  are	  beliefs	  or	  judgements	  about	  something	  being	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  and	  if	  we	  can	  examine	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  beliefs	  a	  person	  holds	  about	  the	  object	  of	  her	  emotions	  by	   investigating	   its	   object,	   we	   can	   judge	   whether	   a	   certain	   emotion	   is	   in	   place	   in	   a	  certain	   situation.	   If	   her	   beliefs	   about	   the	   object,	   say	   that	   a	   bear	   is	   dangerous,	   are	  rational—the	   bear	   is	   indeed	   dangerous	   and	   is	   able	   to	   attack—she	   is	   “justified	   in	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experiencing	  an	  emotional	  reaction	  based	  on	  them”	  (Taylor	  1979,	  165-­‐168).	  If	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  the	  fear	  is	  irrational	  and	  unjustified.	  The	  kind	  of	  examples	  of	  irrational	  emotions	  favoured	  in	  these	  accounts	  are	  connected	  with	   situations	   in	   which	   my	   reaction	   is	   not	   in	   line	   with	   the	   situation	   or	   based	   on	   a	  mistaken	  assumption.	  I	  am	  afraid	  although	  the	  situation	  is	  not	  dangerous,	  or	  I	  am	  angry	  although	  I	  lack	  a	  reason	  to	  be.	  A	  central	  example	  is	  also	  when	  my	  emotional	  response	  is	  disproportionate	   to	   the	   danger	   or	   injustice	   of	   a	   situation.	   These	   cases	   presuppose	   a	  particular	   understanding	   of	   what	   the	   situation	   is	   like	   that	   is	   available	   both	   to	   those	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  emotion,	  and	  to	  those	  taking	  a	  rational	  stand	  on	  it.	  Here,	  I	  simply	  stand	  in	  need	  of	  more	  if	  I	  am	  to	  change	  my	  mind	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  situation.	  	  I	  may,	  say,	   be	   angry	   at	   a	   colleague	   for	   not	   handing	   in	   her	   share	   of	   a	   plan	   at	   a	   settled	   date,	  regarding	  this	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  her	  constant	  sloppiness.	  When	  she	  excuses	  herself	  to	  me	  and	   tells	  me	   that	   some	   family	   problems	   prevented	   her	   from	   doing	   it,	   I	   am	   struck	   by	  remorse	  at	  my	  previous	  anger.	  I	  now	  find	  it	  to	  be	  too	  harsh	  a	  response.	  Here,	  one	  might	  well	   say	   that	  my	   anger	  was	  not	   justified,	   or	   not	   justified	   to	   the	   extent	   in	  which	   I	  was	  angry.	  Let	   us,	   however,	   imagine	   a	   messier	   case.	   (Many	   philosophers	   like	   to	   keep	   their	  examples	  tidy,	  but	  I	  believe	  that	  one’s	  philosophizing	  is	  really	  put	  to	  the	  test	  when	  one	  places	   one’s	   arguments	   in	   a	   real	   life	   context.)	   Suppose	   a	   married	   couple	   is	   having	   a	  quarrel.	   Suppose	   they	   had	   both	   entered	   the	  marriage	  with	   exaggerated	   fantasies	   and	  idealizations	  about	  what	   the	  marriage	  would	  offer	   them.	  She	  had	  envisaged	  a	  meeting	  with	  a	  stranger,	  which	  would	  take	  her	  out	  of	  her	  usual	  surroundings.	  He	  had	  found	  her	  to	   be	   “grace	   itself	   …	   perfectly	   lovely	   and	   accomplished”,	   the	   kind	   of	   wife	   that	   would	  adorn	  his	  home	  with	  female	  charm.	  If	  you	  have	  read	  George	  Eliot’s	  Middlemarch	  you	  do	  not	  have	  to	  use	  your	  imagination	  any	  longer	  but	  can	  simply	  recollect	  the	  story	  of	  doctor	  Tertius	  Lydgate	  and	  Rosamond	  Vincy,	  henceforth	  referred	  to	  as	  Rosamond	  and	  Lydgate.	  If	   you	   are	   not	   acquainted	   with	   the	   novel,	   or	   fail	   to	   remember	   the	   details	   of	   their	  struggles,	  you	  may	  now	  suppose	   that	  our	  doctor	  has	   run	   into	  economic	  problems	  and	  suggested	  to	  his	  wife	  that	  he	  would	  sell	  their	  house.	  She	  is	  anything	  but	  willing	  to	  agree	  with	  him.	  Without	  his	  knowledge,	  she	  averts	  his	  plans	  and	  writes	  a	   letter	   to	   the	  uncle	  from	  whom	  he	  has	  estranged	  himself	  asking	  for	  money.	  	  When	  Lydgate	  reads	   the	  stinging	  reply	  of	  his	  uncle,	   the	  couple	   is	  caught	  up	   in	  an	  “I	  said”	  “You	  said”.	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He	  says:	  	  	  “It	   will	   be	   impossible	   to	   endure	   life	   with	   you,	   if	   you	  will	   be	   always	   acting	  secretly	  –	  acting	  in	  opposition	  to	  me	  and	  hiding	  your	  actions.”	  …	  “Will	  you	  only	  say	  that	  you	  have	  been	  mistaken,	  and	  that	  I	  may	  depend	  on	  your	  not	  acting	  secretly	  in	  future?”	  	  She	  is	  quick	  to	  perceive	  the	  request	  in	  his	  tone	  and	  answers	  with	  coolness.	  	  “I	  cannot	  possibly	  make	  admissions	  or	  promises	  in	  answer	  to	  such	  words	  as	  you	  have	  used	  towards	  me.	  I	  have	  not	  been	  accustomed	  to	  language	  of	  that	  kind.	   You	   have	   spoken	   of	   my	   ‘secret	   meddling,’	   and	   my	   ‘interfering	  ignorance,’	  and	  my	  ‘false	  assent.’	  I	  have	  never	  expressed	  myself	  in	  that	  way	  to	  you,	  and	  I	  think	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  apologise.	  You	  spoke	  of	  its	  being	  impossible	  to	  live	  with	  me.	  Certainly	  you	  have	  not	  made	  my	  life	  pleasant	  to	  me	  of	  late.	  I	  think	  it	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  I	  should	  try	  to	  avert	  some	  of	  the	  hardships	  which	  our	  marriage	  has	  brought	  on	  me.”	  (Eliot	  1994,	  633-­‐635)	  	  	  The	  example	  is	  much	  richer	  than	  anything	  I	  can	  account	  for	  here,	  and	  there	  are	  aspects	  of	  it	  that	  I	  cannot	  touch	  upon.	  I	  hope,	  however,	  that	  this	  marital	  strife	  allows	  you	  to	  see	  the	   different	   perspectives	   on	   the	   situation	   which	   is	   a	   characteristic	   feature	   of	   many	  angry	   quarrels.	   In	   many	   cases	   of	   fear,	   there	   is	   considerable	   agreement	   as	   to	   what	  situations	   are	   dangerous.	   In	   Rosamond	   and	   Lydgate’s	   case,	   however,	   their	   different	  ways	   of	   thinking	   that	   that	   the	   other	   has	   done	   them	   a	   wrong	   is	   constitutive	   of	   our	  understanding	  of	   their	  being	  angry.	   If	   they,	  as	   it	  were,	  described	   their	   situation	   in	   the	  same	  terms,	  there	  would	  not	  be	  anything	  for	  them	  to	  be	  angry	  at	  in	  the	  other.	  What	  distinguishes	   this	  situation	   from	  the	  situation	  where	   I	  had	  been	   ignorant	  of	  a	  fact,	  is	  the	  impossibility	  of	  separating	  the	  reasons	  they	  give	  for	  their	  respective	  feelings	  of	   anger	   and	   betrayal,	   from	   their	   feeling	   this	   way,	   and	   vice	   versa.	   What	   makes	   the	  attribution	  of	  anger	  or	  betrayal	  intelligible	  is	  their	  giving	  expression	  to	  their	  feelings	  in	  such	  terms.	  Lydgate’s	  words	  “It	  will	  be	  impossibleto	  endure	  life	  with	  you,	  if	  you	  always	  act	   in	   opposition	   to	   me”	   is	   both	   a	   description	   of	   how	   he	   sees	   his	   situation	   and	   an	  articulation	  and	  expression	  of	  his	  emotions.	  	  	  This	  case	  then	  points	  to	  examples	  of	  emotion	  where	  our	  engagement	  in	  the	  situation	  is	   internally	   related	   to	  what	  our	   situation	   is.	  We	   cannot	   therefore	  meaningfully	   speak	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  situation	  it	  is,	  without	  considering	  the	  emotions	  of	  which	  our	  different	  descriptions	  are	  expressive.	   It	   is	   in	   the	   light	  of	  Lydgate’s	  anger,	  and	  Rosamond’s	  more	  withheld	  distaste	   for	  her	  husband	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  contested	  claims	  of	  doing	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something	  wrong	  comes	  to	  life.	  These	  cases,	  then,	  reveal	  an	  important	  indeterminacy	  in	  what	  we	   can	   come	   to	   think	   of	   as	   relevant	   facts	   in	   a	   situation,	   since	  what	  we	   come	   to	  think	  of	  as	   facts	   in	  the	   first	  place	   is	   itself	  dependent	  on	  our	  ways	  of	  emotionally	  being	  engaged	  in	  our	  situation	  (cf.	  Hertzberg	  2004).	  In	  this	  respect,	  a	  proper	  investigation	  into	  the	   intentionality	  of	  emotion	  does	  not	  only	  serve	   to	   loosen	  up	   the	  classical	  distinction	  between	  reason	  and	  emotion	  by	  showing	   the	  rational	   features	  of	  emotion.	   It	  also	  asks	  for	  a	  serious	  revision	  of	  rationality,	  and	  of	  thinking	  as	  a	  whole.	  We	  can	  no	  longer	  hold	  on	  to	   accounts	   of	   reasoning	   that	   largely	   regards	   it	   as	   a	   conscious	  process	  we	  undergo	   to	  realize	   our	   aims,	   but	   have	   to	   include	   spontaneous	   embodied	   responses,	   as	   well	   as	  unconscious	  elements	  in	  what	  we	  think	  of	  as	  acting	  reasonably.	  Here,	  it	  is	  also	  significant	  to	  remember,	  that	  words,	  such	  as,	  “That	  was	  wrong”	  or	  “You	  went	  behind	  my	  back”,	  “You	  betrayed	  your	  promises	  to	  me”,	  do	  not	  simply	  have	  the	  role	  in	   conversation	   of	   constituting	   descriptions	   of	   facts.	   They	   are	   means	   of	   hurling	  accusations	  at	  each	  other,	  and	  themselves	   form	  reasons	   for	   the	  other,	  not	  primarily	   to	  believe	   certain	   things,	   but	   significantly	   to	   feel	   certain	   ways,	   such	   as	   hurt,	   offended,	  remorseful,	  and	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  ways.	  They	  are	  meant	  to	  make	  someone	  listen,	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  wrong,	  or	  ask	  for	  forgiveness.	  	  This	  has	  repercussions	  for	  how	  we	  are	  to	  perceive	  the	  kinds	  of	  reasoning	  concerned	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  understanding	  another	  person’s	  emotional	  response,	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  What	  is	   it	   in	  this	  conflict	  that	  Rosamond	  and	  Lydgate	  fail	  to	  understand?	  If	  we	  suggest	  that	   either	   of	   them	   is	   not	   getting	   the	   facts	   right	   we	   do	   not	   grasp	   the	   depth	   of	   their	  conflict.	  We	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  said	  not	  only	  to	  have	  differing	  beliefs	  about	  the	  same	  world,	  but	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  they	  inhabit	  different	  worlds.	  This	  way	   of	   speaking	   about	   the	   couple	   as	   living	   in	   different	   worlds	   is	   inspired	   by	  Wittgenstein’s	  remark	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  where	  he	  writes,	  “The	  world	  of	  the	  happy	  man	  is	  a	  different	  one	  from	  that	  of	  the	  unhappy	  man”	  (1993,	  6.43).	  It	  is	  not	  that	  Rosamond	  and	  Lydgate,	   in	   any	   simple	   sense,	  misunderstand	   or	  make	  mistakes	   about	   their	   situation.	  Neither	  is	  it	  that	  they	  merely	  value	  the	  situation	  in	  different	  ways;	  Lydgate	  finding	  that	  “acting	  secretly…	  in	  opposition	  to	  him”	  is	  a	  terrible	  thing	  to	  do,	  while	  Rosamond	  thinks	  it	  is	  perfectly	  acceptable.	  Rather	  their	  whole	  quarrel	  revolves	  around	  what	   it	  is	  that	  each	  of	  them	  had	  done.	  They	  embody	  two	  meaningful	  perspectives	  on	  what	  their	  situation	  is.	  The	  kind	  of	  difficulty	  facing	  Rosamond	  on	  Lydgate,	  as	  it	  were,	  is	  not	  the	  difficulty	  of	  acknowledging	  a	  fact	  they	  had	  foregone	  in	  their	  previous	  reasoning.	  	  It	  is	  on	  the	  whole	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not	   a	   difficulty	   in	   understanding	   any	   one	  particular	   thing.	   Their	   failure,	   rather,	   lies	   in	  them	  not	  understanding	  each	  other.	  	  This	   failure	   to	   understand	   each	   other,	   should	   not	   be	   understood	   in	   the	  epistemological	  sense	  of	  saying,	  “I	  don’t	  understand	  this”.	  It	  is	  rather	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  moral	  desperation	  or	  outrage	  that	  is	  expressed	  in	  cries	  such	  as,	  “I	  don’t	  get	  you”	  or	  “You	  don’t	   understand	  me!”	   Here,	   then,	   it	   is	  meaningful	   to	  mark	   a	   contrast	   between	   being	  angry	  at	  something	  (the	  other	  has	  said	  or	  done)	  and	  being	  angry	  at	  someone,	  a	  contrast	  cognitive	   accounts	   mostly	   leave	   unnoticed.	   Whereas	   the	   first	   sense	   points	   to	   their	  response	  to	  some	  object,	   the	  second	  points	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  relation	  they	  have	  with	  each	  other.	   What	   is	   needed	   if	   their	   situation	   is	   to	   change	   is	   not	   more	   information,	   but	  
forgiveness	  in	  their	  emotional	  attitude	  towards	  each	  other.	  	  Their	  difficulty	  of	  coming	  to	  see	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  other’s	  understanding	  of	  it,	  and	  accepting	  what	  regarding	  it	  in	  such	  a	  way	  could	  mean	  to	  them,	  is	  the	  difficulty	  of	  listening	  to	  the	  other	  and	  taking	  seriously	  the	  suggestion	  that	  he	  or	  she	  could	  give	  a	  meaningful	   depiction	   of	   what	   had	   happened.	   It	   is	   a	   failure	   to	   realize	   that	   the	   other’s	  differing	  perspective	  is	  not	  only	  something	  for	  them	  to	  judge,	  but	  to	  learn	  from	  and	  also	  be	  changed	  by. It	  is	  their	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  each	  other	  to	  open	  up	  to	  each	  other,	  to	  be	  there	  for	  each	  other	  and	  allow	  the	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  of	  the	  other	  to	  matter	  to	  their	  own.	  It	  is	   the	  difficulty	  of	  admitting	   that	   they	   too	  had	  done	  something	  wrong,	   the	  difficulty	  of	  abstaining	   from	   self-­‐righteousness.	   Their	   difficulties	   of	   understanding	   each	   other,	   as	   I	  hope	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  the	  above	  descriptions,	  are	  revealing	  of	  their	  difficulties	  and	  failures	  to	  love.	  	  This	  sense	  in	  which	  emotions	  at	  times	  embody	  different	  meaningful	  perspectives	  on	  the	  same	  situation,	   is	  not	  meant	   to	  exclude	   the	  sense	   in	  which	  we	  may	  emphasize	   the	  need	   for	  becoming	  clear	  about	   the	   truth	  of	  what	  has	  happened,	  or	   the	   sense	   in	  which	  different	  emotional	  responses	  can	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  better	  or	  do	  more	  justice	  to	  what	  has	  happened.	   It	   does,	   however,	   encourage	   us	   to	   search	   for	   more	   nuanced	   ways	   of	  understanding	   the	   kind	   of	   criticism	   that	   can	   be	   directed	   at	   emotions	   than	   cognitive	  accounts	  of	  emotion	  have	  offered	  us	  so	  far.	  	  Speaking	  about	  Rosamond	  and	  Lydgate’s	  quarrel,	  we	  may	  well	  reach	  a	  stage	  at	  which	  we	   say,	   “Now	  we	   know	  what	   really	   happened”.	   We	   find	   a	   description	   that	   brings	   us	  peace.	  The	  tragedy	  in	  speaking	  about	  them	  as	  inhabiting	  worlds	  that	  do	  not	  meet,	  in	  one	  sense	  of	  “world”,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  they,	  in	  another	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  clearly	  live	  in	  the	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same	  world.	  What	   I	  want	   to	  criticize	   is	   rather	   the	   idea	   that	   there	  could	  be	  one	  neutral	  
(rational)	  description	  with	  reference	  to	  which	  we	  could	  judge	  once	  and	  for	  all	  whether	  their	  emotions	  are	  in	  place	  or	  not.	  It	  is	  not	  so	  that	  the	  only	  position	  from	  which	  we	  can	  criticize	  emotionally	  distorted	  understandings	  is	  a	  disengaged	  one.	  	  Even	   if	   I,	   as	   a	   reader,	  may	   feel	   that	   Rosamond	   is	   in	   the	  wrong—“she	   really	   did	   go	  behind	  his	   back”—this	   conviction	   is	   also	   expressive	   of	  my	   feelings	   in	   the	  matter.	  As	   I	  read	  on,	  I	  am	  gripped	  by	  Lydgate’s	  growing	  desperation	  at	  her	  lack	  of	  understanding.	  I	  experience	   it	  myself.	  We	  could	  even	  say	  that	  my	  ability	   to	  understand	  Lydgate’s	  anger	  presupposes	   the	  ability	   to	   react	   to	  his	   situation	  or	   similar	   situations	  with	  anger.	  Even	  before	  their	  confrontation	  when	  I	  learn	  what	  Rosamond	  is	  up	  to,	  my	  irritation	  grows.	  I	  anticipate	  Lydgate’s	  response	  as	  he	  finds	  out,	  for	  it	  is	  also	  my	  response.	  Someone	  unable	  to	  feel	  anger	  would	  not	  understand	  what	  the	  situation	  was	  about.	  Rather	   than	   thinking	   that	   the	   internal	   relation	   between	  what	  we	   feel	   and	  what	  we	  take	  as	  facts	  of	  the	  situation,	  disqualifies	  all	  talk	  about	  facts,	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  seriously	  consider	  what	  it	  means	  for	  these	  kinds	  of	  facts	  to	  be	  partly	  constituted	  by	  our	  emotions.	  How	   do	   my	   emotions	   come	   into	   the	   judgement,	   say,	   whether	   Rosamond	   really	   went	  behind	   Lydgate’s	   back,	   or	   how	   their	   different	   idealizations	   of	   middle-­‐class	   marriage	  contributed	   to	   their	   difficulties	   of	   understanding	   each	   other?	   This	   turn	   to	   emotion,	  involves	   a	   move	   away	   from	   the	   primarily	   epistemological	   persceptive	   from	   which	  cognitive	   accounts	   approach	   the	   question	   of	   the	   truth	   of	   a	   judgement.	   It	   points	   our	  direction	  at	  the	  moral	  implications	  of	  that	  same	  question.	  	  To	   see	   the	   truth	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   situation,	   I	   am	   not	   required	   to	   step	   out	   of	   it	   as	   an	  emotionally	   responsive	   human	   being.	   I	   am	   asked	   to	   scrutinize	   how	   I	   am	   already	  involved	  in	  it.	  Through	  reflection	  on	  my	  own	  involvement	  in	  a	  situation,	  what	  I	  say,	  think	  and	   feel	   in	   it,	   I	   learn	   something	   both	   about	   the	   situation	   and	   about	   myself.	   The	  recognition	  that	  what	  I	  say,	  can	  never	  be	  completely	  separated	  from	  taking	  a	  stand	  on	  how	  things	  are,	  also	  calls	  me	  to	  question	  what	  kind	  of	  emotions	  and	  thoughts	  I	  want	  to	  take	   responsibility	   for.	   What	   emotions	   are	   predominant	   in	   my	   meetings	   with	   other	  people?	  Of	  what	  characther	  are	  my	  ways	  of	  perceiving	  them?	  Is	  my	  world	  full	  of	  joy	  or	  anger,	   pride	   or	   disappointment,	   hope	   or	   bitterness,	   love	   or	   hate?	   Does	   my	  understanding,	   and	  my	  philosophizing,	   give	   expression	   to	   a	   love	   that	   tells	   us	   that	   our	  emotions	  are	  not	  only	  there	  to	  be	  criticized	  for	  blinding	  us	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  world,	  but	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that	   our	   conversations	   with	   each	   other,	   enlivened	   by	   emotion,	   can	   give	   us	   new	  possibilities	  to	  rediscover	  our	  world	  and	  what	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  heart	  can	  grasp	  in	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∗	  The	  presentation	  develops	  a	  theme	  that	  I	  discuss	  more	  extensively	  in	  my	  Ph.D.	  thesis	  
What	  We	  Talk	  About	  when	  We	  Talk	  About	  Love	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  chapter	  two.	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